

## Political Rights and Liberties



### a. Right to Access Information

1. Article 13 of the Lebanese Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and the press, implying a broader right to access information.
2. On February 10, 2017, the Right to Access to Information (RATI) Law No. 28 was adopted by the Lebanese Parliament. This legislative reform only saw light eight years after Lebanon's ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), as well as the submission of the initial draft law to Parliament in 2009. The RATI Law was the first comprehensive legal instrument that binds Lebanese administrations to proactively disclose specific information pertaining to their activities, as well as to respond to any request to access information from the public.
3. The enactment of the RATI Law reflects the Lebanese Government's commitment to upholding international human rights standards—particularly Article 19 of the UDHR and ICCPR, which affirm the right to seek, receive, and share information freely. Beyond legal compliance, the law serves as a cornerstone for building accountable and transparent institutions, aligning with SDG 16 on justice and good governance. It also paves the way for Lebanon's accession to the Open Government Partnership, restores public trust in state institutions, attracts investment, and fosters healthy competition among public and private entities bound by transparency obligations. One of the law's positive features is its inclusion of proactive disclosure obligations, which require public

bodies to publish key categories of information without waiting for a request.

4. Initially, the law's implementation faced major obstacles, including legal ambiguities, the absence of an implementation decree, and the lack of an operational oversight body. The RATI Law was amended in July 2021, alongside the issuance of its Implementation Decree No. 6940/2020, making access to information faster, more inclusive, and less burdensome for citizens.

5. Despite the adoption of the RATI Law, its amendment, and the issuance of its implementation decree, compliance across public administrations remained inconsistent. While the law lays the foundation for transparency and accountability, without genuine commitment from public administrations, it risks remaining little more than ink on paper. To monitor this, TI-LB developed the Right to Access to Information Index, which evaluates and ranks public institutions based on their proactive disclosure behavior[1]. In June 2024, six key ministries were assessed across six criteria, including publication of information in accessible formats, proactive disclosure of key documents, ability to submit information requests electronically, and details about assigned information officers. Results revealed major gaps: the Ministry of Economy and Trade scored highest (58.33%), while the Ministry of Telecommunications scored zero, lacking even a functional website. The assessment highlights persistent shortcomings in transparency and uneven law implementation across public administrations.

6. On the ground, citizens who try to exercise their right to access information often encounter frustrating bureaucratic roadblocks. In many cases, public employees are simply unaware of the law's provisions, leading to unjustified rejections. Some departments refuse to issue a notification of receipt, an essential step that activates legal deadlines, effectively stalling the process. Others insist on in-person follow-ups, creating unnecessary burdens for the requester. In more troubling cases, administrations reject requests without explanation, refer citizens to higher authorities, or hide behind vague claims of confidentiality, all of which undermine the purpose of the RATI law.

7. The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) was established under Law No. 175/2020 to handle complaints of non-compliance, it only became operational in January 2022 with the appointment of its six members. Since becoming operational, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) has taken concrete steps to enforce the RATI Law. In response to complaints submitted by TI-Lebanon, the NACC issued two decisions, on 6 March and 30 May 2024, requiring the Ministry of Public Works and CMA Beirut Terminal subsidiary of CMA CGM to disclose the contract for managing the

Port of Beirut's container terminal. While the private company complied indirectly, the Ministry failed to respond despite being formally notified. This case underscores the continuing challenges of enforcement and highlights how transparency and accountability ultimately depend on the willingness of public administrations and companies managing public facilities to comply with oversight mechanisms and legal obligations.

8. In parallel, on July 13, 2020, the Ministerial Anti-Corruption Committee adopted the national plan to implement the RATI Law, which aims to address its weak enforcement. The plan consists of ten action points focused on developing effective, transparent, and accountable public institutions, with a two-year timeframe for full execution. However, five years have passed, and a substantial part of the plan has yet to be executed.

9. In April 2025, the Lebanese Parliament passed a law amending banking secrecy regulations. The reform allows key oversight bodies—such as the Central Bank, the Banking Control Commission, and independent auditors—to access banking data going back up to ten years. While this is a positive step toward enhancing transparency and accountability for politicians and public figures, its impact is limited by the 10-year timeframe.

10. The right to access information in Lebanon continues to face numerous legal and practical obstacles, including:

10.1. Lack of Deterrent Penalties for non-compliance with the decisions of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, rendering such decisions susceptible to disregard and stripping Law No. 28/2017 (as amended by Law No. 233/2021) of its enforceability.

10.2. Broad Exceptions in Article 5 of Law No. 28/2017, which prevent the disclosure of certain information without clearly providing the opportunity to apply a “public interest test[2],” potentially conflicting with international standards.

10.3. Inability to enforce the NACC's decisions through judicial means in cases of non-compliance, due to the absence of a clear legal provision allowing recourse to the State Council or other responsible entities to compel public administrations to implement these decisions.

10.4. Challenges in Monitoring the Private Sector, even when it holds the requested information, as there is no legal and effective tool to compel its cooperation or enforce decisions against it.

10.5. The proposed amendments aim to close these gaps and strengthen the right to access information by embedding the principles of transparency and accountability more firmly in Lebanon.

## **11. Recommendations:**

We urge members of the Human Rights Council to call upon the Lebanese government to:

11.1. Implement the Right to Access to Information Law effectively, appoint an information officer in every public administration to receive and process citizen requests, and adhere to their proactive disclosure obligation.

11.2. Amend both the Right to Access to Information Law (Law No. 28/2017) and the Law establishing the National Anti-Corruption Commission (Law No.175/2020), to introduce clear and binding penalties for non-compliance with the Commission's decisions, including the following recommendations:

11.3. Introduce appropriate accountability mechanisms, including the possibility of financial penalties, to encourage compliance by public administration officials.

11.4. Automatically dismiss officials from their positions if they persist in non-compliance after receiving a formal warning.

11.5. Introduce a "public interest test" into Article 5 of the Right to Access to Information Law, so that exemptions are not absolute, and any potential harm is weighed against the public benefit of disclosure.

11.6. Empower the National Anti-Corruption Commission to impose coercive penalties on private sector entities that refuse to provide requested information, based on the provisions of Article 569 of the Code of Civil Procedure to ensure the enforcement of the Commission's decisions.

11.7. In cases where the National Anti-Corruption Commission issues a decision in favor of an information requester and the concerned entity fails to comply, individuals and institutions shall be granted the right to appeal to the State Council to compel implementation, through the adoption of a fast-track judicial mechanism to ensure timely and effective redress.

11.8. Ensure that the Lebanese Official Gazette is made freely accessible to the public in line with international transparency standards. The Gazette should be searchable, readable, and downloadable online without charge, presented in a user-friendly format to enable all citizens, including those with limited financial means or digital literacy, to stay informed about laws, decrees, and public decisions.

11.9. Establish a centralized national online platform to publish all public information and documents – including budgets, government contracts, oversight reports, laws, and decrees – ensuring it is freely accessible and user-friendly for the general public.

11.10. Conduct a nationwide awareness campaign targeting both public servants and the general public, and mandate training for designated information officers in public

administrations on processing information requests and distinguishing between public and protected information.

11.11. Create specialized units within each ministry to oversee the implementation of the Right to Access to Information Law, and require them to submit annual compliance reports to the Cabinet, Parliament, and the general public, detailing challenges, number of requests received and responded to, and measures taken to improve transparency.

11.12. Develop national performance indicators and regular assessment standards to evaluate the level of compliance of public administrations with the law, and ensure these are established and monitored in cooperation with civil society organizations to strengthen transparency and public accountability.

## **b. Right to Free Vote and Democratic Election**

1. The right to free vote and democratic elections in Lebanon continues to face serious challenges, as recurring violations, weak oversight, and the absence of meaningful reform continue to undermine the integrity of the electoral process. Despite holding elections, the process itself remains fraught with systemic flaws that prevent it from meeting international democratic standards.

2. The 2022 Lebanese parliamentary elections were a stark example of these issues. Numerous dysfunctional aspects of Electoral Law No. 44/2017 remained unaddressed, including the unequal distribution of electoral constituencies, the lack of regulation around blank ballots, unreasonably high campaign spending ceilings, the absence of a women's quota, and opaque vote-counting procedures. The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) observers documented hundreds of violations both during the campaign period and on election day, ranging from vote buying and media bias to violations of electoral silence and the misuse of public resources.

3. Additionally, the results of the [2022 Parliamentary Elections Observatory Report](#) identifies a representative survey of women candidates among which 51 % experienced a form of violence or intimidation during their campaign. These violations highlight concerns regarding the democratic nature of these elections and their alignment with international standards.

4. From 2021 to 2025, these concerns persisted and were further amplified by the repeated postponement of municipal elections, originally scheduled for 2023 and eventually rescheduled for May 2025. This delay deprived citizens of basic political representation at the local level and raised concerns about the extent to which democratic obligations are being prioritized over political considerations. While the

election of a president in early 2025 ended a prolonged institutional vacuum and offered a window for political reactivation, it did not lead to any significant progress on electoral reform.

5. During this period, LADE continued to play a central role in monitoring the electoral environment, advocating for reform, and raising awareness about the importance of electoral integrity. Civil society organizations emphasized that holding elections on time is only one part of the democratic equation; equally important are fairness, transparency, and inclusion. As the country prepares for municipal elections in May 2025, the government faces increased pressure to ensure these elections meet democratic standards and are free of the violations observed in previous cycles.

6. The ongoing attacks in Southern Lebanon have created an unsafe environment, making it difficult for some citizens to vote. The looming threat of Israeli airstrikes led to lower voter turnouts in every district for the 2025 municipal elections. The Ministry of Interior noted drops in voter turnout by as much as [15.67% in Bint Jbeil](#) and [12.54%](#) in Marjayoun. In Akkar, Northern Lebanon, a man allegedly stole a ballot box, an incident that was formally denied by the Minister of Interior and Municipalities. Numerous indicators pointed to an unsafe election environment in this region, including an incident in which a physical altercation between a citizen and a soldier resulted in the citizen's stabbing. A total of [405 complaints](#) were filed regarding the municipal elections in the country, with 43% originating in Akkar alone. While celebratory gunfire is a widespread tradition in Lebanon, it poses serious risks; in Ain al-Dehab, a fatality was reported following gunfire that erupted after the announcement of the election victors. In response to such incidents, on May 15, 2025, Parliament approved an urgent amendment to Law No. 71, doubling the penalties for firing gunshots into the air.

7. Women's representation in local government saw a notable increase during the 2025 municipal elections, with women elected to 10.37% of positions - up from 5.4% in the 2016 cycle. While this marks a positive step toward gender parity, significant gaps remain, particularly regarding the ongoing debate over instituting a quota for women in elected office.

## **8. Recommendations :**

Reforms are crucial not only for restoring public trust, but also for laying the groundwork for democratic elections in the future. Moving forward, we reiterate the urgent need for:

8.1. Adopt a Comprehensive electoral reform, especially with parliamentary elections on the horizon.

8.2. Revise the electoral law to ensure equitable representation and district drawing,

enforcing realistic and enforceable campaign spending limits.

8.3. Introduce mechanisms to increase women's political participation

8.4. Improve the transparency and efficiency of the vote-counting process.

8.5. Establish an independent and permanent electoral management body with full administrative and financial autonomy to oversee all stages of the electoral process, from planning to implementation.

8.6. Introduce clear legal definitions and enforceable penalties for electoral offenses to ensure accountability and deter violations.

8.7. Guarantee equal access to media and impartial coverage for all candidates and political lists, and establish a media monitoring unit during elections to detect violations and impose sanctions as appropriate.

8.8. Adopt a mandatory quota of at least 30% for women and 10% for youth in both parliamentary and municipal elections to promote gender equality and enhance the political participation of women and youth.

8.9. Ensure full accessibility for persons with disabilities during the electoral process by adapting polling stations and training election staff on inclusive and non-discriminatory practices.

8.10. Promote diaspora voting rights by facilitating remote voting mechanisms for Lebanese citizens abroad while safeguarding the integrity and transparency of the process.

8.11. Ensure the timely and transparent publication of election results and related data – including turnout rates, vote counts by polling station, and details of appeals or cancellations – on an official, accessible, and user-friendly online platform.

8.12. Develop and implement crisis contingency plans to guarantee voter access and safety in border or conflict-affected areas, including through mobile voting stations, enhanced security coordination, or alternative voting arrangements.

### **c. Freedom of Opinion and Expression**

1. Article 13 of the Lebanese Constitution guarantees: "The freedom to express one's opinion orally in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association shall be guaranteed within the limits established by law". Still, the limits of the law remain wide, and the Lebanese State sometimes uses broad defamation laws to criminalize free speech and expression.

2. From 2020 to 2024, Lebanon experienced a rapid decline in freedom of expression and press. Repressive measures, once considered exceptions, gradually became the norm in the government's approach to dealing with the media and civil

society. Moreover, media and artistic materials continue to be censored arbitrarily under the pretext of threatening national security or inciting sectarian strife.

3. The year 2020 marked a pivotal turning point in this trajectory. In the aftermath of the October 17, 2019, uprising and the Beirut port explosion on August 4, 2020, authorities chose to escalate security measures and media repression rather than addressing citizens' demands. This shift led to the establishment of a police state mentality, where security and military forces were mobilized to suppress protests. Journalists and photographers [faced physical assaults](#), their equipment was destroyed and they were targeted with rubber bullets and tear gas.

4. Simultaneously, dozens of journalists and activists were summoned for social media posts, using vague legal provisions related to slander and defamation. These summonses were often accompanied by pressure to delete content or sign pledges. During this period, [cultural workers were summoned before the military court](#).

5. Lebanese authorities reinstated a practice from the Syrian occupation era, requiring journalists to obtain [prior authorization from the military's Directorate of Guidance](#) before conducting street interviews.

6. In 2020, Lebanon refused to sign the final statement of the second World Press Freedom Conference, [citing objections to provisions supporting LGBTQ+ rights](#). This refusal signaled an official, hostile stance towards individual rights.

7. By 2021, the situation further deteriorated, marked by the assassination of political activist and writer [Lokman Slim](#), who had previously been the target of [smear and incitement campaigns](#). This year also witnessed the militarization of public discourse due to significant incidents such as the [Tayouneh clashes](#), along with an [escalating hostile rhetoric against Judge Tarek Bitar](#), who was leading the investigation into the port explosion.

8. In 2022, Lebanon saw a decline in its ranking on the [Press Freedom Index](#) issued by Reporters Without Borders. Attacks and threats against journalists increased, particularly from ideologically driven "electronic armies." [Artists also faced bans](#) on their works. Media institutions were increasingly impacted by the ongoing economic crisis, struggling to pay salaries, provide health coverage, or maintain employee insurance. Some institutions were forced to lay off staff, while others closed their doors entirely.

9. By 2023, authoritarian practices deepened. Journalists faced [prison sentences](#) and the loss of civil rights, while legal procedures were applied outside the legal framework against journalists and activists. Insulting public authorities carries a sentence of up to 1 year imprisonment; insulting the President carries a sentence of up to 2-years imprisonment; and insulting religious rituals and the Military carries a sentence of up to 3 years [imprisonment](#). Articles 582 and 584 of the Criminal Code lay down the general charge for libel of private citizens. This carries up to a 3-month prison



sentence or a 50,000 LL to 400,000 LL [fine](#).

10. There was also the deliberate targeting of journalists by Israel in the south, constituting a war crime that resulted in the killing of photographers [Issam Abdallah](#) and [Rabih Maamari, and reporter Farah Omar](#), with no accountability until today. Seven other journalists were also injured.

11. The Lebanese state has failed to adequately protect journalists and to fulfill its obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law. Although the Lebanese government initially adopted a decision to grant the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction to investigate alleged war crimes committed by Israeli forces, this measure was subsequently undermined and the required steps to formally accept the ICC's jurisdiction over crimes committed in Lebanon were not taken. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly declined to formally notify the ICC of the decision, and failed to file the required declaration with the court. Within a month, the government reversed its position. This reversal has significantly weakened prospects for international accountability for war crimes committed in Lebanon and has denied victims a credible path to justice.

12. Beirut Pride and similar initiatives have been shut down repeatedly. In 2023 and 2024, public events and discussions have been canceled or banned, often justified as preserving "public morality." These restrictions were essentially the result of social pressure led by violent hate groups supported by religious entities, who incited public outrage and targeted LGBTIQ+ initiatives through coordinated campaigns of intimidation and misinformation. A harsh [crackdown on the LGBTQ+ community](#) took place, with the [Bar Association intervening to suppress](#) lawyers' free speech.

13. Lebanon's media are still mainly legislated through the 1962 Press and Publication Law and the 1994 Audiovisual Law, which are outdated and lack amendments regarding the digital revolution. Although Parliament has been discussing changes to the media laws for years, the law has yet to pass. However, one of the draft law's weaknesses is that it fails to protect citizens from defamation charges since only journalists are protected from arrest on defamation or libel grounds.

14. Since 2020, numerous journalists in Lebanon have been subjected to arbitrary and retaliatory dismissals by media institutions, often without the provision of legally mandated compensation. These dismissals have been justified on economic grounds or as responses to journalists' political opinions and union activities. For example, the Lebanese TV station MTV terminated the employment of Elsy Moufarrej, from the Alternative Press Syndicate, allegedly due to her labor organizing efforts. Similarly, the BBC reportedly dismissed journalist Nada Abdel Samad following her public stance on the war in Gaza and her expression of solidarity with the Palestinian people.

15. This situation is exacerbated by systemic dysfunction within Lebanon's labor judiciary. Many journalists have refrained from filing complaints before the labor courts due to the courts' prolonged ineffectiveness since 2023. Others who have pursued legal recourse have seen no resolution, primarily because the government has failed to appoint its representatives to the tripartite labor courts, rendering these bodies inoperative and denying complainants access to justice.

16. Censorship of musical, cultural, and media public broadcasts continues to exist in Lebanon and is subject to the Law of November 17, [1947](#). This allows censorship for the following reasons: maintenance of public order, respect for public morals, prevention of sectarian incitement, and insulting public authorities. The Directorate General of General Security (DGGS) exercises the function of applying the law, but does so loosely, using a high degree of [discretion](#). Even though the Ministry of Culture sometimes interferes in allowing the broadcast of specific works, there are widespread complaints about the excessive influence of religious authorities and fundamentalists on the DGGS's decisions regarding the evaluation of cultural works.

14. In 2024, there was a continuation of violent targeting of journalists, particularly in the south. Israeli airstrikes targeted gatherings of journalists, despite their clear identification. The most violent attack occurred when several journalists were targeted while sleeping in Hasbaya. Legal provisions were increasingly used to criminalize opinions expressed on social media. Independent media institutions faced political and financial pressures, while journalists were subjected to both digital and physical threats.

## **17. Recommendations:**

17.1. Amend or repeal laws criminalizing insult, slander, and defamation, particularly where it is being used to prosecute activists, journalists, and critics of the government. The laws should be reformed to ensure they are not used to silence dissent or stifle free speech.

17.2. Implement stronger protections for journalists, including clear legal provisions to safeguard them from harassment, intimidation, or arbitrary detention. Ensure that those who threaten or attack journalists are held accountable.

17.3. Ensure that a law proposal on the Military Court is enacted, suspending its use for trying civilians, particularly in cases related to expression or peaceful protest, and transferring all such cases to civilian courts

17.4. Abolish the practice of prior censorship on cultural works and transfer the licensing authority from the General Security to a specialized committee within the Ministry of Culture.

17.5. Reform the National Media Council through transparent elections and appointments of qualified independent members

- 17.6. Strengthen judicial independence as a fundamental guarantee for the protection of public freedoms.
- 17.7. Abolish provisions criminalizing attacks on the prestige of public institutions and affirm the right of citizens and journalists to critique state performance.
- 17.8. Modernize Lebanon's media legislation by replacing the outdated 1962 Press Law and 1994 Audiovisual Law with comprehensive, rights-based laws that guarantee press freedom and align with international human rights standards and the digital era.
- 17.9. Establish an independent media regulatory body, free from political and sectarian influence, to oversee broadcast and online media, ensure diversity, guarantee fair licensing, and monitor violations.
- 17.10. Ensure transparency and accountability in content regulation by defining clear criteria, guaranteeing the right to appeal censorship or bans of cultural, media, and artistic content, and involving civil society and cultural actors in the process.
- 17.11. Combat hate speech and online harassment by adopting legal measures that clearly distinguish between protected expression and incitement to violence.
- 17.12. Provide emergency protections for journalists operating in conflict zones by offering safety training, supplying protective equipment, and coordinating with international bodies to ensure accountability for attacks against media workers, including recent killings in southern Lebanon.
- 17.13. Endorse international human rights instruments, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, and fully implement Human Rights Council recommendations related to freedom of expression.
- 17.14. Formally recognize and implement protection protocols for journalists, aligned with international standards such as those developed by UNESCO and the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity.
- 17.15. Establish a national independent investigative body to document and pursue accountability for attacks against media personnel.
- 17.16. Cooperate with international human rights mechanisms, including Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression and Extrajudicial Killings, and call for independent fact-finding missions.
- 17.17. Seek international condemnation-including by The Human Rights Council- and accountability for Israel's violations of international humanitarian law, particularly with respect to attacks on journalists.
- 17.18. Ensure the protection of journalists from arbitrary dismissal, particularly in relation to their freedom of expression or union activities, and take immediate measures to restore the effective functioning of labor courts by appointing all necessary judicial and governmental representatives, thereby guaranteeing timely and fair access to legal remedies for labor rights violations

#### **d. Freedom of Association**

1. While Article 13 of the Lebanese Constitution guarantees the freedom of association, Lebanese law bans undeclared associations and gives power to the government to reject new associations and dissolve former ones. In addition to that, Lebanese legislation includes repressive requirements for various kinds of associations formed, such as syndicates of employees and [employers](#).

2. Although Lebanese NGOs continue to operate openly, several limitations restrict their work. NGOs must notify the government of their formation and wait for a notification number from the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM). This process can take up to a few years, leaving many organizations in administrative limbo. With no checks on the process by other government bodies or external organizations, the MoIM has the discretionary power to suspend or delay issuing notification numbers. The MoIM has often used these techniques to intimidate activists.

2. Over the last 5 years, civic space for civil society continued to shrink, as authorities and security agencies cracked down against NGOs, especially those among them providing services to Syrian refugees. NGOs were repeatedly asked to submit lists with personnel details to be allowed into refugee camps. Authorities have also issued ad-hoc decisions demanding NGOs send their internal data, including personal information of beneficiaries, etc.

3. In relation to freedom of assembly, the primary legislation in Lebanon governing the right to peaceful assembly is the 1911 Public Assemblies Law, which is still outdated as it dates to the Ottoman era. The law provides that the MoIM or local administrative authority must be notified at least 48 hours before a public assembly. Although the provision in this article is rarely respected or implemented in practice, it has allowed the MoIM to ban peaceful assemblies arbitrarily under the pretext of “a threat to national security” or “inciting immorality and disrupting the public order.”

4. Law enforcement officials, and even non-state actors, have used unauthorized and disproportionate force against protesters during demonstrations in [2021](#), [2022](#), [2023](#) and [2025](#).-In 2022 and 2023, crackdown on LGBTQIA+ assemblies significantly increased, with the MoIM issuing a ban on related events and assemblies, and non-state actors assaulting LGBTQIA+ marches and events.

5. The right to form and join trade unions is governed by special provisions under the Lebanese Labor Law. While the law establishes the right to form multiple trade unions for the same occupation, it discriminates between Lebanese citizens and foreign residents, as the latter are not allowed to create or join trade unions in Lebanon. The law also necessitates obtaining a license from the Ministry of Labor (MoL) before forming a

trade union. It also excludes some categories of workers from the right to create one, especially those excluded from the [law](#).

6. The latest media draft law, formulated by the Lebanese Parliament's Administration and Justice Committee, mandates the existence of only one media syndicate, constraining the rights of journalists and media workers to freely join and establish [associations](#).

7. In 2025, the right to unionize was put under significant strain when a journalist was dismissed from a major media outlet following their involvement in union activities. The dismissal came after the union publicly criticized the outlet's legal actions against members of the press. The journalist's refusal to withdraw from the union reportedly led to their [termination](#).

8. Public sector employees are restricted from forming unions as per the 1959 Public Sector Staff Regulation (PSSR) and are excluded from provisions of the general labor law. Article 15 of the PSSR states that government employees can neither go on strike nor organize, join, or form unions or professional organizations. Article 65 of the decree also states that all employees taking part in a work strike must resign [beforehand](#).

9. The MoL still does not recognize the workers' union formed by migrant workers in Lebanon, due to limitations imposed by the Lebanese Labor law and its denial of foreigners the right to elect or be elected as union representatives.

10. Recommendations:

10.1. Repeal ad hoc directives requiring NGOs to submit personal beneficiary data or internal personnel records.

10.2. Prioritize enabling assemblies to proceed safely by taking preventive protection measures and deploying security to safeguard demonstrators.

10.3. Ensure that any restrictions on peaceful assemblies—particularly bans based on national security, morality, or public order—are duly justified, highlighting the GoL's inability to protect protesters, with evidence of a concrete threat proportionate to the risk identified, in line with international human rights standards.

10.4. Increase public awareness of judicial avenues and clear, accessible procedures for citizens to challenge assembly bans.

10.5. Establish a new legal framework for the use of force by all security agencies in the country, in compliance with international standards.

10.6. Immediately cease all bans and restrictions on peaceful LGBTQIA+ assemblies and investigate incidents of violence by both state and non-state actors against LGBTQIA+ persons and events—with a public report published.

10.7. Train all law enforcement officials (ISF and Army) on international standards related to the use of force, freedom of assembly, and expression, and establish an independent mechanism for complaints related to protest-related abuses.

10.8. Revise the Lebanese Labor Law to eliminate the requirement for prior Ministry of Labor approval to form trade unions and remove nationality-based restrictions to allow foreign residents to form or join unions, ensuring legal recognition of the migrant domestic workers' union.

10.9. Amend the 1959 Public Sector Staff Regulation to explicitly recognize public employees' rights to form unions and participate in collective action without fear of dismissal.

10.10. Revise the draft media law to remove the provision restricting journalists and media workers to a single syndicate and instead allow pluralistic representation through multiple independent associations.

10.11. Establish an independent and transparent mechanism to oversee the registration and monitoring of NGOs, limiting the unrestricted power of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, and ensuring timely and non-arbitrary processing of association notifications.

10.12. Guarantee the legal right for all civil society organizations to operate freely without fear of administrative harassment or politically motivated suspensions.

10.13. Develop and implement a comprehensive reform of the Public Assemblies Law, replacing the outdated 1911 legislation with a modern framework aligned with international standards that guarantees the right to peaceful assembly, limits grounds for banning assemblies, and ensures procedural fairness.

10.14. Promote protections for marginalized groups, including LGBT persons, to safely exercise their rights to assembly and association, free from discrimination, intimidation, or violence.

10.15. Remove all legal and administrative barriers to the formation and operation of trade unions, ensuring the full inclusion of foreign workers and migrant domestic workers in union activities.

10.16. Guarantee job protection and non-retaliation policies for workers and journalists engaged in union activities.

10.17. Ensure transparency and democratic representation within all professional syndicates and unions by promoting independent election processes.

10.18. Launch public awareness campaigns and capacity-building programs to educate citizens, civil society, and law enforcement officials on the rights fundamental freedoms and values.